Say you are the GM of an organization that, while part of a rather large market, is struggling with defining your identity. Your roster is one of, if not the, oldest in the game. Your team hasn't performed well in awhile, and you need to make some changes. You've recently freed up a bunch of cash -- say, $18 million a year -- and now you have to decide how to spend it. You obviously have a few options. Many of the more attractive options consist of investing this money in a variety of young players, acquired through trades. You could accomplish this by taking on the contracts of some has-beens. You could also sign a number of decent free agents who could improve the ballclub. Either way, this chunk of money is so large that you can easily snatch up three All-Stars. What would you do?
Well, whatever choice you made, real-life GM Brian Sabean had a better idea. Rather than take the time to do some scouting and efficiently divvy up about $15 million a year, Sabean -- the Giants' GM -- decided to blow it all on one star pitcher. The problem was, the pitcher wasn't much of a star. By now, you know where we're going. Before the 2007 season, Barry Zito was signed to a 7-year, $18 million-a-year contract.
Barry Zito is not the best pitcher in the league. In 2002, he received the AL Cy Young Award. He has not had an ERA under 3.30 -- which he had in 2003 -- since then. In fact, in the three years prior to signing the largest pitching contract in history, Barry Zito had an ERA slightly north of 4.00. We know that ERA's do not solely define a pitcher. Zito has always had control problems. But, like many power pitchers, he has a decent enough strikeout rate to make up for it. However, Zito's stats are, in no way, misleading. He was once a good pitcher. He is not, however, getting better. He is getting worse. Observe.
The following chart was created by taking Barry's stats and dividing them by IP. In the green, you see Strikeouts -- a stat you want to increase. In the yellow are Walks -- something you want to decrease. That scary red line are Earned Runs -- something you really do not want to increase. Unfortunately, prior to his signing with the Giant's, all of Zito's stats were heading in the wrong direction. The straight lines are trend lines of linear regressions. This graph took me 20 minutes to create. Had the Giant's management taken 20 minutes out of their busy days to do the same, they may have saved themselves $18 million for the next seven years.
The trends on the graph are in no way misleading. Zito had an another bad year in 2007, and the numbers fit right in with the trend line. And that brings us to 2008. After starting off the season 0-6 with an ERA of 7.54, Zito was yanked from the rotation and assigned to the bullpen. When the Giant's signed Zito, I knew it was a bad deal. But I didn't expect it to turn this sour.
Zito is not this bad. So what is the problem? The newest news is that he is seeing a sports psychologist and believes his problem is mental. He may be right. But, there is no way he is worth $18 million a year. Not back in 2001, and not now. $10 million should have locked him up. But, at the same time, Barry is a workhorse. 2007 (196.2 IP) was the first year that he pitched under 200 innings, and you could even chalk that up to the NL switch. In that sense, Barry is worth more than your typical 4.00 ERA pitcher. But, still -- he is a 4.00-3.80 ERA guy at best. In 2006, Zito was one of 17 pitchers to pitch over 200 innings and run an ERA under 4.00. However, there were 14 guys ahead of him. Which leads us to our next target -- Jason Schmidt.
Jason is in exactly the same boat. However, Jason is older than Barry, (35 to Barry's 29), and better for less time. Now, here is where you are going to want to listen closely. Jason Schmidt was never a great pitcher until he came to San Francisco. He came to the Giant's from the Pirates, who gave him up for Ryan Vogelsong, a career 5.86 ERA reliever. Schmidt arrived in mid 2001 and immediately started getting better. In 14 games with the Pirates, he had an ERA of 4.61, consistent with the past 5 years. In 11 games with the Giants, he had an ERA of 3.39. I will let you look at the numbers. The data isn't compelling, but it is interesting that upon moving to San Francisco with Mr. Bonds, Schmidt's numbers immediately went up. In 2005, when baseball began steroid testing, Schmidt's numbers began to fall back to Earth. You have to wonder if Schmidt wasn't using some variation of the Bonds Cocktail. I usually wouldn't bring this up, but it is one thing that could explain an otherwise confusing data set. Other things could be the team atmosphere, age, maturity, pitching coach, etc. It's only a trend, and I'm not going to indict the guy based on some funny looking numbers. I'm merely pointing out something that might explain Schmidt's surprising rise and fall. His K/IP, BB/IP, and ER/IP were much higher and lower, respectively, from the time he arrived in San Francisco through 2004, the last year steroids were not tested for in baseball.
In any case, the Giant's passed off Schmidt to the Dodgers who, surprise, signed him for $43 million, 3 year deal. This mistake isn't as egregious as the Zito one. A shorter contract and a player with obvious flaws, but an apparently good pitcher. But, again, Schmidt had essentially three good years and was much older, being 33 at the time of his signing. He has performed miserably in Los Angeles, pitching only 25 innings in the one-plus season he has been around. As a pitcher that relies on power, it would be expected that he would deteriorate in his late 30's. That's why he only got three years. But Jason probably could have gotten this deal from another club; I can't imagine another team that would give Zito his current contract.
So where does this leave us? Sometimes, I am amazed at the contracts that some clubs sign. I can't imagine how anyone can figure that these deals are good deals to make. But the Barry Zito deal was, literally, the most expensive mistake ever. Of course, he still has six long years left on that contract to pull it together. This, in turn, leaves me with one question for Mr. Brian Sabean.
Were you high?
Andruw Jones, as you may know, has been struggling as of late. He is not hitting the baseball. Jones finished the 2007 season with the Braves with a shiny .222 average and a glimmering .311 OBP. Not quite what you expect from a guy making $14 million a year. After that disaster of a season, Jones declared himself a free agent. You'd think that the race to sign a guy coming off a season like that wouldn't have many competitors, and you would be right. Unless, of course, your name is Ned Colletti, GM, LA Dodgers. Colletti decided that Andruw Jones was the big bat his team needed. Colletti -- the only GM interested in signing Jones besides Royals GM Dayton Moore -- rewarded Jones handsomely, signing him to a 2-year, $36.2 million deal. Jones received a $12.2 million signing bonus, earns $9 million in 2008, and $15 million in 2009. Usually, when you sign a suspect player, you leave your back door open, your ramp down, and your stairway fully extended. Not Ned! He locked himself in, big time. The Red Sox couldn't move Manny when he was making $17 million a year. Do the Dodgers have any chance of moving a scrub like Jones when he is set to make $15 million next year? No. 
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